Three critical questions for Baroness Shafik’s review of UK international development
Authored by Thomas Nurcombe and Zoe Swanwick
On resigning as President of Columbia University, Baroness Minouche Shafik announced that she will be heading back to the House of Lords to lead a “review of the government’s approach to international development and how to improve capability” at the request of the new Foreign Secretary.
At a time when the UK’s international development capabilities have been significantly reduced and traditional approaches to development are being challenged, this review has an important task in tackling how the UK can rebuild and enhance its diminished development capabilities in a world where the landscape of international development has shifted dramatically.
These are 3 key questions the review needs to address in order to achieve this:
How does the UK establish a pathway back to the 0.7% GNI target?
The new Labour Government has chosen to not immediately reinstate the 0.7% GNI Official Development Assistance (ODA) target, instead aiming to return aid to previous levels ‘as soon as the fiscal situation allows’. Responding to the 2020 budget cuts, Keir Starmer, in his then role as Leader of the Opposition was critical that there was “no expected timeline for that criterion to be met at all. What the Chancellor [set] out is not a temporary cut in overseas aid; it is an indefinite cut.”
With this in mind, a review of the UK’s international development capabilities must answer this question of timeline, and propose a clear pathway to return to the 0.7% commitment within this parliament.
Moreover, the review should explore ways of ensuring ODA’s impact is maximised to deliver our objectives overseas. As the chair of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for the OECD put it, the real “elephant in the room” for ODA reporting is the spiralling proportion going towards in-donor refugees. Though the DAC urges its members to show restraint in reporting in-donor refugee costs as ODA, in 2022 and 2023, the UK spent over a quarter (28.9% and 27.9% respectively) of ODA spending on in-donor refugee costs. This is greater than the total spent on bilateral development assistance. The review should answer this broader question of how to ensure ODA is utilised effectively to achieve development goals, and not stray from its intended purpose.
How do we preserve the integrity and impact of development within the FCDO?
The Government has ruled out any plan to undo the DFID and FCO merger, leaving us to focus on maximising the potential of the new Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). In line with the review’s aims to assess the current approach and capabilities of the UK’s international development efforts, how might we make the most of the still relatively new department?
Though there are clear advantages to an integrated department, the rushed timeline has been particularly harmful to the UK’s development offer. DFID was incredibly well-respected as a development mechanism, renowned for its technical expertise and effectiveness in delivering aid, making it one of the world’s leading aid organisations. However, the chaotic merger process, completed in just two months, undermined the UK’s strengths in development and left the department struggling to function effectively in this area for nearly three years. With this context, how do we ringfence development within the merged department to ensure that the UK’s international aid efforts are both effective and resilient?
How can the UK re-establish its reputation and influence through development?
The UK is increasingly perceived to be an unreliable partner by the developing world, and Western financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank are viewed with growing scepticism. Meanwhile, anti-Western powers - particularly China - are gaining appeal with their muscular alternative financial offers, which are presented as having “no strings attached” and are framed under the banner of “South-South” cooperation. This offer is filling the financing gaps left by the West’s and particularly the UK’s retreat. In 2022, China was the largest official creditor in over half of all low-income countries, enabling it to wield significant political and economic influence. In contrast, UK spending in low- and middle-income countries decreased in the same year.
In this era of geopolitical competition, the review should explore how development can be leveraged to rebuild trust and strengthen the position of the UK and the broader West while countering the influence of revisionist powers, which, as the Integrated Review Refresh stated, is “the main driver of the deteriorating security environment.” We must understand what developing countries seek from development and how Britain can contribute effectively, either through bilateral aid or using our diplomatic influence to reform multilateral financial institutions.
Finally, the review should be grounded in a broader approach to foreign policy that integrates both defence and diplomacy, building on the comprehensive analysis of the Integrated Review Refresh in 2023 and the International Development Strategy in 2022.
Treating each component in isolation from one another will not help to secure the UK against emerging risks and threats, and will harm the success of UK development. Diplomacy is essential for understanding the needs and aspirations of developing countries, while defence plays a crucial role in enhancing the effectiveness of aid.
Simultaneously, development is key to building trust in the UK and protecting against the monumental threats to peace and prosperity. In doing so a “3Ds” approach - defence, diplomacy and development - goes beyond the moral arguments for aid, as compelling as they are, and demonstrates how development, when done correctly, can feed into a more comprehensive and strategic approach to foreign policy that boosts prosperity and security at home and abroad.
